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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
rather than statutes of limitation. In Torsiello v. State,20 9 however, the
Court of Claims held that an amendment to section 10(1) of the Act
is retroactive, thus viewing the time provision in section 10(1) as a
true statute of limitations. Lewis, in finding that the time periods in sec-
tion 10(2) were conditions precedent, offers a much stricter and more
questionable construction of the statute.210
GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW
GML 50-a to 50-i: Notice of claim not required in contract action.
Generally, section 52 of the Nassau County Law and section 11-4.1
of the Nassau County Administrative Code provide that prior to com-
mencing an action against Nassau County, it must be served with a
notice of claim which complies with section 50-e of the General
Municipal Law.
In Meed v. Nassau County Police Department,211 the plaintiff, a
former patrolman, sought recovery of salary and fringe benefits ac-
cruing during the period of his suspension from the police department.
The county raised a preliminary objection that the plaintiff had failed
to comply with section 52 of the Nassau County Law and section 11-4.1
of the Nassau County Administrative Code by not serving it with a
notice of claim. The Supreme Court, Nassau County, accepting the
plaintiff's contention, held that no notice of claim was necessary to
support the plaintiffs contract-based action.212 In so doing, the court
relied on an examination of the language of the General Municipal
Law, which limits its application to negligence, malpractice, and other
tort-based litigation.213 It further found that the language of section 52
of the County Law and section 114.1 of the Nassau County Adminis-
trative Code did not specifically encompass actions on contract or
breach of contract or claims for salary.2 14 Noting that the Education
Law,215 the Town Law, 216 and the Village Law2 17 specifically require a
209 70 Misc. 2d 294, 332 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (mem.).
210 "Construction as a statute of limitations is favored." McLaughlin, Civil Practice,
15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 381, 894 (1963). The two-year time period under the wrongful death
statute (N.Y. Esr., PowEas & TRur LAw § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967)) has been uniformly
held to be a statute of limitations. See McLaughlin, supra. It can be argued, however,
that in waiving its immunity from suit, the state limited its liability to situations where
the claimant has strictly complied with the time provisions of the Court of Claims Act.
See Phillips v. State, 35 App. Div. 2d 750, 314 N.Y.S.2d 951 (3d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
21170 Misc. 2d 274, 332 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (mem.).
212 Id. at 275, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 3813(1) (McKinney 1970) (requiring a notice of claim for all
claims).
216 N.Y. TowN LAw § 65 (McKinney 1965); Le Fever v. Town of Marbletown, 284
App. Div. 1085, 135 N.Y.S.2d 831 (3d Dep't 1954) (mem.).
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notice of claim to maintain such an action, the court reasoned that the
absence of such a mandate in the instant sections reflected the Legisla-
ture's intent that none be necessary.218
The instant decision, which is supported by decisional law, 219 is a
sound construction of the pertinent statutes.
GML 50-e: Infant permitted to file late notice of claim where infancy
may have been important factor in failure to timely file.
Section 50-i of the General Municipal Law permits actions in tort
against a municipality only if a notice of claim is served within ninety
days after the claim arises. Section 50-e(5) provides, inter alia, that the
court may, in its discretion, permit an infant to file a notice of claim
within a reasonable time after expiration of the ninety-day period if
he fails to serve a timely notice "by reason of" his infancy. There exists
a marked divergence within the appellate division with respect to the
level of proof required to establish the nexus between the fact of in-
fancy and the delay. The problem is further complicated when counsel
is timely retained, but a delay in filing nonetheless occurs.
The First Department has generally required that a causal rela-
tionship between the fact of infancy and the delay be demonstrated.
Where the delay is attributable to the attorney's error or inadvertence,
the statutory standard is not met.2 0 The other departments approach
the issue more liberally, presuming disability from the fact of infancy,
even where the infant's attorney has been derelict, upon a showing
that the delay was attributable in any substantial degree to infancy.2 21
217 N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 341-b (McKinney 1966); Caruso v. Incorporated Village of
Sloatsburg, 35 App. Div. 2d 988, 317 N.Y.S.2d 959 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
218 70 Misc. 2d at 275, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
219 Sullivan v. Whitney, 25 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1941).
220 See Clark v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 84 App.
Div. 2d 770, 311 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1st Dep't 1970) (mem.), aff'd mem., 28 N.Y.2d 614, 268
N.E.2d 803, 320 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1971); Shankman v. New York City Housing Authority, 21
App. Div. 2d 968, 252 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1st Dep't 1964) (mer.), aff'd mem., 16 N.Y.2d 500,
208 N.E.2d 175, 260 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1965); Goglas v. New York Housing Authority, 13
App. Div. 2d 939, 216 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1st Dep't 1961) (mer.), aff'd mem., 11 N.Y.2d 680,
180 N.E.2d 910, 225 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1962); Ringgold v. New York City Transit Authority,
286 App. Div. 806, 141 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Ist Dep't 1955) (mer.); Schnee v. City of New York,
285 App. Div. 1130, 141 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1st Dep't 1955) (mem.), aff'd mem., 1 N.Y.2d 697,
134 N.E.d 69, 150 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1956).
221 See Perry v. Board of Educ., 34 App. Div. 2d 1089, 312 N.YS.2d 640 (4th
Dep't 1970) (mer.); Brooks v. Rensselaer County, 34 App. Div. 2d 708, 309 N.Y.S.2d
659 (3d Dep't 1970) (mem.); Kern v. Central Free School Dist. #4, 25 App. Div.
2d 867, 270 N.Y.S.2d 137 (2d Dep't 1966) (mer.); Klee v. Board of Coop. Educ.
Servs., 25 App. Div. 2d 715, 270 N.Y.S2d 230 (4th Dep't 1966) (mer.); Spanos v.
Town of Oyster Bay, 23 App. Div. 2d 881, 259 N.Y.S.2d 917 (2d Dep't) (mem.), aff'd
mem., 16 N.Y.2d 951, 212 N.E.2d 535, 265 N.YS.2d 101 (1965); Pandoliano v. New York
City Transit Authority, 17 App. Div. 2d 951, 234 N.YS.2d 99 (2d Dep't 1962) (mem.);
Biancoviso v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 320, 137 N.Y.S.2d 773 (2d Dep't 1955);
Every v. Ulster County, 280 App. Div. 155, 112 N.Y.S.2d 367 (3d Dep't 1952) (per curiam),
